EXHIBIT "F"

THE CALIFORNIA VOTING RIGHTS ACT

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In 2002, the California Voting Rights Act, S.B. 976, was signed into law. (Elec. Code §§ 14027-14032.) The Act makes fundamental changes to minority voting rights law in California. As of January 1, 2003, the California Voting Rights Act ("CVRA") alters established paradigms of proof and defenses under the federal Voting Rights Act, thus making it easier for plaintiffs in California to challenge allegedly discriminatory voting practices.[1] The potential consequences of this legislation are significant: it could force a city or special district to abandon an electoral system that may be perfectly legal under

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Ms. Leoni has represented and currently represents numerous state agencies, municipalities, counties, school districts and other special districts on districting, redistricting and electoral matters. She has assisted in all phases of such cases including design of plans, the public hearing process, analysis of proposed alternatives, enactment procedures, referenda, districting and redistricting, preparing and advocating preclearance submissions to the U. S. Department of Justice, and defending federal court litigation concerning the legality of electoral systems under the federal constitution and Voting Rights Act. She represented the Administrative Office of the Courts on federal Voting Rights Act issues and electoral questions pertaining to trial court unification in California. She also represented the Florida Senate in designing that state's Senate and Congressional districts, Voting Rights Act preclearance, and in defending against ensuing state and federal court challenges. She also represented the consultant to Arizona's Independent Redistricting Commission in designing redistricting plans for Arizona's state legislative and congressional districts.

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Prior to attending law school, he was a political consultant to several California legislative and initiative campaigns, a research associate at the Rose Institute of State and Local Government, and chairman of a successful initiative campaign in Southern California.

Mr. Skinnell has extensive experience with voting rights matters, both from the legal and technical perspectives. In addition to working on various voting rights lawsuits, he has published numerous articles and studies on voting rights and redistricting, has served as the technical/GIS consultant on several municipal redistrictings, and has prepared a successful preclearance submission to the U.S. Department of Justice under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

[1] As noted in a celebratory press statement by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) following the passage of S.B. 976, which along with the ACLU and voting rights attorney Joaquin Avila, was a primary supporter of the CVRA, the "[b]ill makes it easier for California minorities to challenge 'at-large' elections."

federal law, in the process exposing the jurisdiction to the possibility of paying very high awards of attorneys fees to plaintiffs.[2]

California's cities, counties, and special districts have had almost four decades of experience in complying with the federal Voting Rights Act ("federal VRA"), especially Section 2, the landmark legislation outlawing both intentional discrimination in voting practices and those practices that have unintentional but discriminatory effects when viewed in the totality of the circumstances. (Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, Stat. 437 (1965), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973ff-6 (1994).) Indeed, California has adopted compliance with Section 2 as one of its statutory redistricting criteria for cities, counties, and special districts. (*See, e.g.*, Elec. Code §§ 21601 [general law cities], 21620 [charter cities], & 22000 [special districts].) After decades of litigation under the federal VRA, the courts have provided a wealth of guidance for cities and special districts in identifying practices that may have discriminatory effects. Most notable in California is the prevalence of the "at-large" electoral system (see description below). Jurisdictions have learned to consider changing to a district-based electoral system when they have minority group residents who are sufficiently numerous and geographically concentrated to form a majority in a single-member district, especially when that minority group, despite running candidates for election, consistently fails to elect.

But now the voting rights legal environment with which cities and special districts have grown familiar has changed significantly. Here are some of the highlights.

CVRA Highlights.

- **Focus of the CVRA: "At-large" and "From-district" Elections.**

If your city or special district elects its governing board members "by-district," (*i.e.*, only by the voters of the district, sometimes called "division" or "area," in which the candidate resides), you can stop reading now. The CVRA does not apply to a by-district electoral system. However, if you have an "at-large" or "from-district" system, read on!

The CVRA applies only to at-large and from-district electoral systems, or combination systems. (Elec. Code §§ 14026(a), 14027.) At-large systems are those in which each member of the governing board is elected by all the voters in the jurisdiction. Most

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[2] In federal voting rights cases, the litigation bill can run to hundreds of thousands of dollars even for a small jurisdiction of a few thousand people. *See* Florence Adams, *Latinos and Local Representation: Changing Realities, Emerging Theories* 73 (Garland 2000) (noting that in the City of Dinuba, California, the costs of federal voting rights litigation added up to nearly $60 per person, more than the annual cost of Dinuba's Fire Department). In a voting rights case filed against the City of Santa Paula in 2000 and recently settled, the City reportedly spent $700,000 for attorneys fees. *See* T.J. Sullivan, "Santa Paula Quiet on Measure D," *Ventura County Star* B-01 (Oct. 20, 2002).

jurisdictions in California, especially smaller jurisdictions, have at-large electoral systems. "From-district" elections differ from at-large systems only in that they require each member of the governing board to live within a particular district. Election, however, is still by all the voters in the jurisdiction, rather than being limited to the voters within a district. There are also combination systems in which, for example, a primary election may be conducted "by-district", but the general election is conducted "from" those same districts, *e.g.*, the top two vote winners in the primary in each district run for election "at-large" in the general election.

Each of these variations is equally vulnerable to challenge if the minority plaintiffs can show that racially-polarized voting undercuts their ability to elect or influence the election of minority-preferred candidates. Features that might cause plaintiffs to scrutinize a city or special district as a potential target for a CVRA challenge include a history of electoral losses by minority candidates or a history of unresolved issues disproportionately affecting the minority community (*e.g.*, affordable housing, street and sidewalk maintenance, juvenile crime, etc.), coupled with a significant proportion of the population that are ethnic or racial minorities.

- **Protection For Minority Electoral "Influence."**

The federal VRA prohibits the use of electoral systems that abridge the ability of minority voters to *elect* candidates of their choice. Thus, if the minority plaintiffs would have still been unable to elect their chosen candidates in the absence of the challenged at-large system, the plaintiff would have very little chance of stating a federal claim (see below). Not so under the CVRA. The CVRA invalidates not only at-large elections that prevent minority voters from electing their chosen candidates, but also those that impair the ability of minority voters to *influence* elections.

To date, such influence claims have enjoyed *very* limited recognition or success in federal litigation, and California jurisdictions have no real experience with them. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to address influence claims in recent years. *See Johnson v. De Grandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1008-09 (1994); *Holder v. Hall*, 512 U.S. 874, 900 n.8 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); *Voinovich v. Quilter*, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993); *Growe v. Emison*, 507 U.S. 25, 41 n.5 (1993). The federal courts in California have refused to sanction such influence suits as well. *See Aldasoro v. Kennerson*, 922 F.Supp. 339, 376 (S.D. Cal. 1995); *DeBaca v. County of San Diego*, 794 F.Supp. 990, 996-97 (S.D. Cal. 1992); *Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista*, 723 F. Supp. 1384, 1391-92 (S.D. Cal. 1989); *Romero v. City of Pomona*, 665 F. Supp. 853, 864 (C.D. Cal. 1987), *aff'd* 883 F.2d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1989).

Indeed, only two federal courts have ever held[3] that the federal VRA requires, rather than merely permits, the creation of influence districts in the absence of a showing of intentional discrimination, and both are of questionable precedential value. *See Armour v. Ohio*, 895 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1990); *East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of Jefferson*, 691 F.Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988). One of the opinions, *Armour v. Ohio*, was subsequently vacated when rehearing en banc was granted, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1991). On remand the district court implicitly sanctioned such claims again, 775 F.Supp. 1044, 1059 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 1991),[4] but later opinions from the Sixth Circuit have not treated *Armour* as binding on this issue, and have, in fact, expressly rejected influence suits. *See Cousin v. Sundquist,* 145 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 1998) ("We do not feel that an 'influence' claim is permitted under the Voting Rights Act."); *Parker v. Ohio*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8745, *11 (S.D. Ohio). The holding of the second case, *East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership*, was effectively undermined when the court subsequently amended the finding that necessitated the influence claim: that the minority community was too widely dispersed in the jurisdiction to constitute a majority in a single-member district. *See East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of Jefferson,* 926 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting the amended finding that the minority group could indeed constitute a majority in a single-member district).

Given the reluctance of federal courts to enter the political thicket of influence suits, by opening the door to such claims the CVRA greatly expands protection for minority voting rights and, consequently, the potential for liability of cities and special districts.

The next question, of course, is obvious: what constitutes "influence"? The answer, unfortunately, is not so obvious. The CVRA does not define "influence" and there is very little federal precedent on which to rely for guidance. As the federal district court for Rhode Island put it in *Metts v. Almond*:

> "Ability to influence" itself, is a nebulous term that defies precise definition. If it means only the potential to alter the outcome of an election, it provides no standard at all because a single voter can be said to have that ability. On the other hand, if it means something more, there does not appear to be any workable definition of how much more is required and/or any meaningful way to determine whether the requirement has been satisfied.

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[3] Several other courts have assumed as much, without so deciding, instead ruling on other grounds. *See, e.g., Voinovich*, 507 U.S. at 154; *West v. Clinton*, 786 F.Supp. 803, 806 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

[4] The district court in *Armour* purported to avoid the question of influence claims. *See* 775 F.Supp. at 1059 n.19 ("We need not reach the question of whether [an influence claim] may be viable under the Voting Rights Act because we find that the plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating an ability to elect a candidate of their choice."). But as Judge Batchelder noted in dissent, the Court only avoided the issue by first holding that the plaintiffs need not constitute a majority in the reconfigured district. 775 F.Supp. at 1079 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). In so ruling, "the majority opinion effectively h[eld] that there is a cause of action under Section 2 when political boundaries are drawn so that they fail to maximize a minority group's ability to influence the outcome of elections." *Id.*

217 F.Supp.2d 252, 258 (D.R.I. 2002).

Nevertheless, defining "influence" is the task that a California court may soon face. The definition may well be case-specific to the demographic and political circumstances in each defendant jurisdiction, leaving local jurisdictions without clear guidelines.

- **Streamlined Proof for Plaintiffs.**

Federal voting rights cases under Section 2 require that a successful plaintiff show that (1) the minority group be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority of the eligible voters in a single-member district, (2) there is racially-polarized voting, and (3) there is white bloc voting sufficient usually to prevent minority voters from electing candidates of their choice. *Thornburg v. Gingles,* 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). If (and only if) all three of these "preconditions" are proven, the court then proceeds to consider whether, under the "totality of circumstances" the votes of minority voters are diluted. (42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) [prescribing the totality of the circumstances standard].)

The CVRA, by contrast, purports to prescribe an extremely light burden on the plaintiff to establish a violation. Under the CVRA, plaintiffs apparently can prove a violation based *solely* on evidence of racially-polarized voting. (Elec. Code §§ 14027 & 14028(e).) Racially-polarized voting is defined as "voting in which there is a difference, as defined in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 et seq.), in the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, and the electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate." (Elec. Code § 14026(e).) *See Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria*, 160 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting relatively lenient "separate electorates" test for determining whether a candidate was a minority-preferred candidate who was defeated by white bloc voting), *cert. denied*, 527 U.S. 1022 (1999).

The CVRA appears to eliminate the first precondition that plaintiffs must prove at the liability stage in federal litigation, that is, that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single member district. (Elec. Code § 14028(c).) Assuming that racially-polarized voting can be proven, the CVRA defers inquiry into the size and geographical compactness of the minority group and the impact of those factors on the minority voters' ability to elect or ability to influence elections, to the remedial phase of the litigation. (See discussion below.)

The CVRA also eliminates the requirement that plaintiffs prove discrimination under the totality of the circumstances test. (Elec. Code § 14028(e).) This departure from the federal standards may prove to be the most significant. Some federal courts have been very lenient in finding racially-polarized voting. They could afford to be so lenient,

because, under federal law, establishing racially-polarized voting is not sufficient to prove a violation. The other *Thornburg v. Gingles* preconditions must be established and a violation must be proven in the "totality of the circumstances" phase of the lawsuit. The totality analysis then permits a federal judge to take into account such matters as the *degree* of the racially-polarized voting and perhaps find that it was not severe enough to warrant judicial intervention into the electoral processes of a city.

The CVRA does not require any comparable "totality of the circumstances" analyses as part of the plaintiff's proof. Under what would seem to be a draconian application of the CVRA, plaintiffs could argue that a jurisdiction is subject to liability if 51% of minority voters vote one way, 51% of non-minority voters vote the other way, and the minority-preferred candidate loses. Whether a court would sanction such an extreme application of the CVRA, without the subsequent safety valve of the totality analysis, cannot be known at this time. Another plausible reading of the CVRA is that the Legislature meant to ease the burden on plaintiffs but still permit the totality analysis to come in by way of defense. (Elec. Code § 14028(e) [stating that many of the traditional totality factors are "probative," but not necessary to establish a violation].)

Despite the fact that Section 14028(a) provides that a violation is established if racially-polarized voting is shown, the legislation does identify at least one other factor that bears on the question of liability. Specifically the CVRA provides that the extent to which candidates who are members of a protected class and who are preferred by voters of the protected class have been elected to the governing body of a jurisdiction is "one circumstance that may be considered *in determining a violation.*" (Elec. Code § 14028(b) [emphasis added].) Thus phrased, the relevance of such evidence would not appear to be limited to the remedial stage, but would affect the question of liability as well. Moreover, the phraseology suggests that other, unspecified circumstances may be considered on the question of liability as well. Under the federal scheme, minority plaintiffs whose preferred candidates have a winning record would find it difficult, if not impossible, to establish a violation of the federal VRA. Presumably this would be the result under the CVRA, but the new law is not explicit on that point. Also, the CVRA specifies that the successful candidate must also be a member of the minority group in order to be taken into consideration as "one circumstance" that may be considered at the liability phase of the litigation. The CVRA is silent on whether the election of non-minority persons who are proven to be the preferred candidates of minority voters can also be considered. Plaintiffs may well argue that such successful minority-preferred candidates do not count.

- **New Remedies.**

The most likely remedy in a successful CVRA action would be to order cities and special districts with at-large, from-district, or mixed electoral systems to change to by-district systems in which a minority group will be empowered either to elect its preferred candidates, or influence the election outcome. But judicial remedies under the Act may

not be limited to the imposition of a by-district system. In cases where the minority group may be too small to form a majority in a single member district (*i.e.,* a district from which one member of the governing board is elected), the CVRA mandates that a court impose remedies "appropriate" to the violation. Indeed, the advocates of limited or cumulative voting systems may see the CVRA as an opportunity to attempt to impose such experimental remedies in California.

In a limited voting system, voters either cast fewer votes than the number of seats, or political parties nominate fewer candidates than there are seats. Theoretically, the greater the difference between the number of seats and the number of votes, the greater the opportunities for minorities to elect their chosen candidates. Versions of limited voting are used in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia (PA), Hartford (CT) and many smaller jurisdictions.

In a cumulative voting system, voters cast as many votes as there are seats. But unlike winner-take-all systems, voters are not limited to giving only one vote to a candidate. Instead voters can cast some or all of their votes for one or more candidates. Chilton County (AL), Alamogordo (NM), and Peoria (IL) all use a version of cumulative voting, as do a number of smaller jurisdictions. The State of Illinois used cumulative voting for state legislative elections from 1870 to 1980.

- **No-Risk Litigation For Plaintiffs.**

The CVRA mandates the award of costs, attorneys fees, and expert expenses to prevailing plaintiffs. (Elec. Code § 14030.) Prevailing defendants, however, are not treated so kindly. The CVRA denies not only attorneys fees but also the costs of litigation to prevailing defendants, unless the court finds a suit to be "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," an extremely high standard. (*Id.*)

Furthermore, California law interprets "prevailing party" more broadly than does the analogous federal law governing attorneys fees awards for actions brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The United States Supreme Court has, as a matter of statutory interpretation, recently rejected the "catalyst" theory of prevailing parties. *Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Servs.,* 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001). The catalyst theory, which the California Supreme Court has previously approved, permits recovery of attorneys fees if there is any "causal connection" between the plaintiffs' lawsuit and a change in behavior by the defendant. *Maria P. v. Riles,* 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1291 (1987). The *Maria P.* court continued:

> "'The appropriate benchmarks in determining which party prevailed are (a) the situation immediately prior to the commencement of suit, and (b) the situation today, and the role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting any changes between the two.'" . . . An award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 is

> appropriate when a plaintiff's lawsuit "'was a *catalyst* motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought,'" or when plaintiff vindicates an important right "'by activating defendants to modify their behavior.'"

Id. at 1291-92 (quoting *Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments,* 32 Cal.3d 668, 685 n.31 (1982); *Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo,* 33 Cal.3d 348, 353 (1983)) (internal citations omitted).

Federal law, by contrast, requires some "change [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant." *Buckhannon,* 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting *Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist.,* 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1987)). In other words, it is not enough under federal law that the defendant changed its conduct voluntarily—there must be some legally compelled impediment to the defendant falling back into the old ways, like a judgment or a settlement.

The California Supreme Court has traditionally treated federal precedent interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as persuasive authority, but it has also held that such federal precedent is not binding with regards to interpretation of state attorneys fee law. *See Serrano v. Unruh,* 32 Cal.3d 621, 639 n.29 (1982). Thus, the *Buckhannon* holding will not inevitably lead California to reject the catalyst theory in CVRA litigation as well.

Charter Cities.

Charter cities should not be complacent in a belief that they are immune from successful challenge under the new CVRA. The CVRA, after all, purports to apply to "cities" without making any explicit distinction between general law or charter cities. (Elec. Code § 14026(c).) It is true that a charter can provide for a form of government or electoral process for a city that is different from the general law. A charter city, however, remains subject to the California Constitution and would be prohibited from adopting or maintaining a discriminatory electoral system or electoral practices that violate the equal protection clause or the right to vote. *See Canaan v. Abdelnour,* 40 Cal.3d 703 (1985), *overruled on other grounds by Edelstein v. City & County of San Francisco*, 29 Cal.4th 164, 183 (2002); *Rees v. Layton,* 6 Cal.App.3d 815 (1970). Furthermore, California courts have recognized that state statutes can override city charters if they are narrowly-tailored to address an issue of statewide concern, even in the core areas of charter city control like election administration. *Edelstein*, 29 Cal.4th at 172-174; *Johnson v. Bradley,* 4 Cal.4th 389, 398-400 (1992). The CVRA expressly provides that it is intended to implement the guarantees of Section 7 of Article I (Equal Protection) and Section 2 of Article II (Right to Vote) of the California Constitution, which are themselves regarded as matters of statewide concern. *See Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach*, 15 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1226 (1993).

It is always possible that the California Supreme Court would decide that, even if preserving the right to vote is a matter of statewide concern, the CVRA sweeps too broadly and cuts too deeply into municipal affairs in violation of the principle of home rule. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[T]he sweep of the state's protective measures may be no broader than its interest." *Johnson,* 4 Cal.4th at 400. *Cf. Bd. of Trustees. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,* 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2000) (when Congress seeks to enforce constitutional protections with legislation, the statutory scheme must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented or remedied); *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For example, charter cities could argue that, assuming eradicating the adverse effects of racially-polarized voting in at-large electoral systems is a matter of statewide concern, the CVRA is not narrowly-tailored because the federal VRA presents a scheme more carefully-crafted to weed out those at-large systems in which, under the totality of circumstances, minority voting rights are abridged, and leave in place those at-large systems in which a minority candidate may have simply lost an election.

Vote of the People.

The sole fact that the voters of a city or special district have enacted an at-large electoral system by ballot measure, or rejected a by-district electoral system by ballot measure, will not protect a jurisdiction. Indeed, the latter may increase the risk to the jurisdiction by serving as persuasive proof of a violation of the CVRA if the by-district system was rejected in an election characterized by a racially-polarized vote.

No Minority Candidates.

The fact that no members of the minority group have ever run for membership on the legislative body will not insulate a jurisdiction from CVRA challenge. The CVRA expressly provides that a violation can be shown if racially-polarized voting occurs in elections incorporating *other* electoral choices that affect the rights and privileges of members of a protected class, such as ballot measures. (Elec. Code §§ 14028(a) & (b).) Some particularly obvious examples from the last decade might include Proposition 187 (denying state services to undocumented immigrants), Proposition 209 (preventing state agencies from adopting affirmative action programs), and Proposition 227 (barring the use of bilingual education in California public schools). *See Cano v. Davis*, 211 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1241 n.37 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (assuming these initiatives may be used to demonstrate racially-polarized voting). But other local measures may also serve the same purpose.

CONCLUSION

California's cities and special districts are entering a new and uncertain era in voting rights law. Much about the CVRA is unclear and federal precedent on key issues appears to have been legislatively overruled. It may require years of litigation to sort it all out. It

is impossible to know now whether California courts will uphold the constitutionality of the CVRA, how they will interpret the new law, or what defenses will be available. Perhaps the "totality of the circumstances" test will be reinvigorated by way of defense. In the meantime, there is a safe harbor under the CVRA (though still not necessarily under the federal Voting Rights Act): a by-district electoral system.

Jurisdictions with a history of electoral losses by candidates who are members of a minority group should consider analyzing those elections for racially-polarized voting. If polarized voting is detected, these jurisdictions may want to consider whether a change to a by-district electoral system is warranted. Demands by minority group representatives for a change to by-district elections must be taken seriously, even if the minority group is not numerous enough to form a majority in a new single member district. Changing voluntarily permits the elected representatives and the voters, rather than adverse plaintiffs or a court, to control the districting process and the considerations that will guide the districting. Once the single member districts are in place, the city or special district is in the CVRA safe harbor, even if the districts are not exactly those that plaintiffs would have preferred.

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EXHIBIT “G”

COUNCIL AGENDA REPORT

TO: City Council

FROM: City Manager and City Attorney

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION DECLARING THE CITY OF SANTA MARIA'S INTENTION TO TRANSITION FROM AN AT-LARGE CITY COUNCIL ELECTED PROCESS TO A DISTRICT-BASED ELECTION PROCESS PURSUANT TO ELECTIONS CODE SECTION 10010

RECOMMENDATION:

That the City Council adopt a resolution declaring its intention to transition from an at-large City Council election process to a district-based elections process, outlining specific steps it will take and providing an estimated timeline for doing so pursuant to Elections Code Section 10010.

BACKGROUND:

The City received a certified letter on December 16, 2016, from Jason Dominguez, Esq., on behalf of his client Hector Sanchez, an unsuccessful candidate for City Council in the November 2016 election, asserting that the City's at-large electoral system violates the California Voting Rights Act, codified at California Elections Code sections 14025–14032 ("CVRA"). Mr. Dominguez claims "polarized voting" may be occurring and threatens litigation if the City declines to adopt district-based elections.

The CVRA was signed into law in 2002. The law was motivated, in part, by the lack of success by plaintiffs in California in lawsuits challenging at-large electoral systems brought under the Federal Voting Rights Act ("FVRA"). In fact, the City of Santa Maria had successfully defended a FVRA lawsuit in the early 1990's brought by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund. This litigation cost over $1 million to defend and took ten years to resolve in the City's favor.

The passage of the CVRA made it much easier for plaintiffs to prevail in lawsuits against public entities that elected their members to its governing body through "at-large" elections with the ultimate goal to transition to "district-based" elections. By way of background, in a district-based election system, a candidate must live in the district he or she wishes to represent.

It is staff's understanding that no such FVRA lawsuits have been filed in California since 2000. Accordingly, all voting rights lawsuits in California have been filed under the CVRA since its passage. Under the CVRA, to prove a violation, plaintiffs must only demonstrate that there is "racially polarized voting." This occurs when there is a

difference between the choice of candidates preferred by voters in a protected class and the choice of candidates preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate. Plaintiffs in other litigation have taken the position that the CVRA does not require a showing of discriminatory intent or an actual electoral injury. They have further argued that the CVRA does not require proof that racially polarized voting actually resulted in the defeat of a group's preferred candidate. No appellate court has yet ruled on these issues.

Cities throughout the State have increasingly been facing legal challenges to their "at-large" systems of electing City Council members. Almost all have settled claims out of court by essentially agreeing to voluntarily shift to district-based elections, while others have defended CVRA challenges through the courts. Ultimately, these cities have either voluntarily adopted, or have been forced to adopt, district-based elections. The exception is the City of Santa Clarita that resolved the CVRA action filed against it by agreeing to change the date of its general municipal election to November of even-numbered years.

Cities that have attempted to defend their existing "at-large" system of City Council elections in court have incurred significant legal costs, including attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiffs. Awards in these cases have reportedly ranged from about $400,000 to over $3,500,000. When sued, the settlements entered into by cities typically have included paying the plaintiff's attorney fees. For example, in February 2015, the City of Santa Barbara reportedly paid $800,000 in attorneys' fees and expert costs to settle their CVRA lawsuit. Another example is the City of Palmdale that incurred expenses in excess of $4.5 million in its unsuccessful attempt to defend against a lawsuit brought under the CVRA. Moreover, what is most concerning is that staff is unaware of any city that has prevailed in defending its "at-large" system of election under a claim filed by any individual or group under the CVRA. Accordingly, staff has concluded that the public's best interest is in preserving and protecting vital general fund revenues from being unnecessarily expended (given the low probability of defending against a CVRA lawsuit) and that this interest outweighs the public's interest in maintaining the current at-large voting system.

DISCUSSION:

Accordingly, after much analysis and in-depth conservations with those most familiar with these types of litigation matters, staff is recommending that the City Council adopt a resolution declaring its intention to transition from at-large to district-based elections following the procedures required by Elections Code section 10010, as amended by AB 350, to establish voting districts. Staff makes this recommendation due to the extraordinary costs to successfully defend against a CVRA lawsuit and the fact that no apparent city has successfully prevailed against a CVRA lawsuit, and that the public interest would best be served by transitioning to a district-based electoral system.

While the City has a sustained history of electing Latinos/as to the City Council, the outcome of litigation is always uncertain. Unlike other cities where at-large elections have prevented Latinos from electing candidates of their choice, the election history for the Santa Maria City Council has demonstrated that Latino candidates have been

regularly elected. Since 1996, at least one Latino/a has been elected to the City Council in each election except the November 2012 election where a Latina candidate (Waterfield) lost by only two votes. In all, ten Latinos/as have been elected to the City Council in the last twenty years. In addition, partly because of appointments made by the City Council to fill unexpired terms, the City Council has been represented by a Latino majority from 2002 until 2010 and the current City Council is a Latino elected majority. Not withstanding the aforementioned history of being able to elect Latinos to the City Council, the CVRA essentially makes any at-large election vulnerable to challenge with a low probability of successfully defending against such a challenge.

Staff estimates that the cost to defend this lawsuit would exceed $1,000,000 even if it were successful, and would likely exceed $2,000,000 if the plaintiff prevailed and the City was ordered to pay plaintiff's attorneys' fees. These attorney fees and costs would be a General Fund liability which would be a significant unexpected expense that could not come at a worse time since the City already has a multi-million dollar structural budget deficit AND pension-related expenses continue to escalate.

It should be noted that Government Code section 34886 permits the legislative body of any city to adopt an ordinance establishing election of members of the legislative body by district. AB 350 was recently adopted by the State Legislature and became effective on January 1, 2017, and amended Elections Code section 10010 to place a cap of a maximum of $30,000 on attorneys' fees that a plaintiff would be entitled to recover if the target city voluntarily adopted an ordinance to establish voting districts either before or after receiving notice of a CVRA violation. In addition, AB350 prohibits a plaintiff from filing a CVRA lawsuit within 90 days of a city's adoption of a resolution declaring its intention to transition to district-based elections. Accordingly, should the City Council adopt the proposed resolution, the maximum the City will have to reimburse Mr. Dominguez in attorneys' fees and costs is $30,000, and plaintiff would be prohibited from filing a CVRA lawsuit until May 22, 2017.

Alternatives:

1. The City Council may elect to place this issue on the ballot and let the electorate decide if they prefer district-based elections. However, even if the voters rejected district-based elections, the City would be vulnerable to a CVRA lawsuit if racially polarized voting is occurring in the City.
2. The City Council may direct staff to defend against any CVRA lawsuits that may be filed. This option will be very expensive to defend, and even if successful, would expose the City to an award of costly attorneys' fees.

Fiscal Considerations:

There will be significant staff time needed to transition to district-based elections because of the staff time that will be incurred for the five (5) public hearings that will be required in addition to the cost for a demographics and elections consultant and special legal counsel. Should the City Council concur with staff's recommendation, the City will only be required to reimburse plaintiff for its attorney's fees and costs up to $30,000. In addition, staff expects roughly a $10,000 increase in election costs for district-based

elections during each of the upcoming election cycles. These fiscal impacts are necessary and unavoidable if the Council transitions to district-based elections.

Impact to the Community:
The decision to change from at-large to district-based voting may have a substantial impact on the community since the City Council has been elected at-large since the City's incorporation in 1905. There may be a profound and noticeable impact to the community if the City adopts district-based elections and confusion until district-based elections are fully implemented in 2020. As proposed, two council seats will be elected by-district in the 2018 election and two or three council seats (pending the outcome of the five public hearings) in the 2020 election after the current incumbents have served their full terms. In some situations, the Mayor may be elected at-large, but all other members of the City Council must reside in the district they represent. The decision whether to establish four voting districts with the Mayor elected at-large, or five voting districts is one of the topics that will be decided upon by the City Council as a result of the minimum of five (5) public hearings that will be held as required by California Elections Code section 10010 should it adopt the proposed resolution.

RICHARD J. HAYDON
City Manager

GILBERT A. TRUJILLO
City Attorney

EXHIBIT "H"

ATASCADERO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
BOARD AGENDA BACKUP
Regular Meeting of November 16, 2021

ITEM: **Resolution # 09-21-22 to Initiate a Transition to a By-Trustee Area Election System Commencing with the 2022 Governing Board Election**

COST: **N/A**

FUNDING SOURCE: **N/A**

PREPARED BY: **Thomas Butler, Superintendent**

OVERVIEW:
The Atascadero Unified School District Board of Education is currently elected under an 'at large' election system, where trustees are elected by voters of the entire District. Trustees are elected in even-numbered years and serve staggered, four-year terms.

Cities, public entities, and other school districts have recently had their at-large election systems challenged under the California Voting Rights Act. These situations have resulted in expensive and divisive litigation.

As provided in Resolution # 09-21-22, the Board intends to immediately begin the process to transition from at-large to by-trustee area elections for the 2022 Governing Board election.

ALIGNED TO DISTRICT CORE VALUES AND GOALS:
Community Partnership: We will actively seek authentic community involvement and develop meaningful community partnerships to support student learning.

RECOMMENDATION: Board of Trustees adopt Resolution # 09-21-22 to Initiate a Transition to a By-Trustee Area Election System Commencing with the 2022 Governing Board Election.

EXHIBIT "I"

RESOLUTION NO. 5743

A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CARPINTERIA, CALIFORNIA, DECLARING ITS INTENTION TO TRANSITION FROM AT-LARGE TO DISTRICT-BASED ELECTIONS BY NOVEMBER OF 2022

WHEREAS, members of the City Council of the City Carpinteria are currently elected in "at-large" elections, in which each councilmember is elected by the registered voters of the entire City; and

WHEREAS, California Government Code section 34886 permits the legislative body of a city to change its method of election by ordinance from an "at-large" system to a "district-based" system in which each member of the legislative body is elected by the voters in the district in which the candidate resides; and

WHEREAS, on July 3, 2017, the City received a letter entitled Notice of Violation of California Voting Rights Act ("Notice") from Jatzibe Sandoval and Frank Gonzalez ("Prospective Plaintiffs") asserting that the City's elections are characterized by racially polarized voting and demanding that the City commence the process to transition to district based elections pursuant to the California Voting Rights Act ("CVRA"); and

WHEREAS, a violation of the CVRA is established if it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs in elections (Elections Code section 14028(a)). "Racially polarized voting" means voting in which there is a difference in the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, and in the choice of candidates and electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate (Elections Code section 14026(e)); and

WHEREAS, the CVRA allows for Prospective Plaintiffs to file a lawsuit against the City if the City does not adopt a resolution of intent to institute district based elections within 45 days of the Notice ("45-day period") (Elections Code section 10010); and

WHEREAS, the Notice states that if the City declines to do adopt a resolution of intention to transition to district elections within the 45-day period, Prospective Plaintiffs will commence a lawsuit to compel district based elections; and

WHEREAS, August 17, 2017 is the 45th day from the date the City received the Notice; and

WHEREAS, at its July 31 special meeting the City Council received public comment on the potential to transition to district elections and a majority of those commenting spoke in favor of instituting a district-based election system; and

WHEREAS, the Prospective Plaintiffs offered to consider a settlement agreement whereby the City would not be required to institute district elections until the November 2022 regular election in order to allow 2020 census data to be taken into account in drawing district boundaries; and

WHEREAS, the City denies that its at-large election system violates the CVRA or any other provision of law and asserts that the City's election system is legal in all respects; and

WHEREAS, the City Council has concluded that the public interest would be served by transitioning to a district-based electoral system due to public support for district elections, the extraordinary cost to defend against a CVRA lawsuit and the uncertainties inherent in litigating a CVRA claim.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CARPINTERIA AS FOLLOWS:

SECTION 1.
The above recitals are true and correct.

SECTION 2.
Before the November 2022 regular election, the City Council will consider adoption of an ordinance to institute a district-based election system, as authorized by Government Code section 34886.

SECTION 3.
Prior to considering an ordinance to establish district boundaries for a district-based electoral system, the City will follow the requirements pursuant to Elections Code section 10010 to solicit public input in the district map drawing process.

PASSED, APPROVED, AND ADOPTED this 14th day August, 2017 by the following vote:

AYES: COUNCILMEMBER(S):

NOES: COUNCILMEMBER(S):

ABSENT: COUNCILMEMBERS(S):

ABSTAIN: COUNCILMEMBER(S):

CONDITIONAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE

This CONDITIONAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELEASE ("Agreement") is entered into on this 14th day of August, 2017 ("Effective Date") by and between the CITY OF CARPINTERIA, a general law city and municipal corporation ("City"), and JATZIBE SANDOVAL and FRANK GONZALEZ, residents of City ("Prospective Plaintiffs"). The above parties are referred to herein individually as "Party" and collectively as "Parties."

RECITALS

A. Since incorporation in 1965, the City Council has been elected through the at-large election system in which each voter may cast one vote for each Council seat that is up for election.

B. On July 3, 2017, City received a Notice of Violation ("Notice") of the California Voting Rights Act ("Act") from Prospective Plaintiffs, alleging that the City's at-large system of electing City Council members violates the Act and threatening suit unless the City transitions to a district-based electoral system, which is an election method in which the candidate must reside within an election district that is a divisible part of the city and is elected only by voters residing within that election district.

C. On July 31, 2017, the City Council held a public meeting to receive public input on the Notice and the potential for transitioning to a district-based election system. The majority of those commenting spoke in favor of instituting a district-based election system.

D. The City Council denies that the City's at-large electoral system violates the Act. Nevertheless, in recognition of the public support voiced at the July 31 meeting for instituting district-based elections and in recognition that litigation involves significant costs and uncertainty, the City Council desires to enter into this Agreement.

E. The Parties desire to delay the institution of district elections until 2022 so that the district boundaries may be drawn based on 2020 census data, which will not become available until 2021.

F. The Parties now wish conditionally to resolve and settle the Notice and all attendant and potential litigation arising therefrom.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements described below, and for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the Settling Parties hereby agree:

1. Obligations of Parties

   A. At its regular meeting on August 14, 2017, the City Council will consider approval of a resolution of intent to institute a district-based election system for City Council seats by the November 2022 regular election.[1] The Council retains the discretion to determine

[1] The November 2022 regular election will occur on November 8, 2022. (Elec. Code § 1000(d).)

whether to institute district-based elections for four City Council seats with the mayor elected at large or to institute district elections for all five Council seats with the mayor appointed by the Council.

B. Provided that the City Council adopts the resolution described in subsection A, Prospective Plaintiffs shall not bring suit against the City prior to November 9, 2022 for any cause of action related to the City's electoral system, including, but not limited to, suit seeking the implementation of district-based elections or claims related to or arising from the Notice.

C. Provided that the City Council adopts the resolution described in subsection A, within 30 days of such adoption, the City will remit a payment of $30,000 to Prospective Plaintiffs as reimbursement of its costs incurred for the work product to support the Notice in fulfillment of the requirement to reimburse prospective plaintiffs' reasonable costs pursuant to Elections Code section 10010(f). The check will be made payable to Prospective Plaintiffs' attorney-of-record Robert Goodman to his trust account Robert Goodman Trust Account. Pursuant to Elections Code section 10010(f)(1), Prospective Plaintiffs have made a demand for reimbursement and staff has substantiated that the documentation provided by Prospective Plaintiffs represents the demography and legal costs incurred by Prospective Plaintiffs supporting their Notice.

2. Condition Precedent

Prospective Plaintiffs acknowledge, understand and agree that the City Council's passing of the resolution described in Section 1 is an express condition precedent to the consummation of this Agreement and the covenants, conditions and agreements contained herein. In the event that the resolution is not approved as set forth in Section 1, then this Agreement shall be null and void and shall be of no further force and effect. In such event, neither this Agreement, nor any of its terms or provisions, shall be admissible in any action or proceeding initiated by Prospective Plaintiffs for any purpose.

Further, the Prospective Plaintiffs recognize and acknowledge that the City Council is under no obligation to pass the resolution and that the Council reserves its discretion and the full measure of its powers to evaluate the resolution in accordance with applicable procedures, standards and requirements. It is understood and agreed that this Agreement shall not be construed in any fashion as an advance determination and does not provide the Prospective Plaintiffs with any expectation as to the outcome of the City Council's decision on the resolution. The City Council's lack of approval or inaction on the resolution will not constitute a default of this Agreement, but instead will constitute a terminating event of this Agreement.

3. Admissibility of Agreement

If the City does not institute district-based elections for City Council seats by the November 2022 regular election, this Agreement shall not be construed as an admission by the City that such failure to act is unreasonable or unlawful under the Elections Code. In addition, this

Agreement may not be introduced into or be admissible in any judicial proceeding other than a judicial proceeding to enforce the terms of this Agreement.

4. Release

A. Subject to the performance of the Parties' obligations in this Agreement, the Parties hereby fully and finally waive, release, and permanently discharge each other (and their respective officers, employees, agents, representatives and attorneys) (the "Releasees"), from any and all past, present, or future matters, claims, demands, obligations, liens, actions or causes of action, suits in law or equity, or claims for damages or injuries, whether known or unknown, which they now own, hold or claim to have or at any time heretofore have owned, held or claimed to have held against each other by reason of any matter or thing alleged or referred to, or in any way connected with, arising out of or in any way relating to the Notice (collectively, the "Released Claims"). In connection with the release of the Released Claims, the Parties waive any and all rights that they may have under the provisions of section 1542 of the California Civil Code, which states as follows:

A general release does not extend to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release, which if known by him or her must have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor.

In the event that any waiver of the provisions of Section 1542 of the California Code provided for in this Agreement shall be judicially determined to be invalid, voidable or unenforceable, for any reason, such waiver to that extent shall be severable from the remaining provisions of this Agreement, and the invalidity, voidability or unenforceability of the waiver shall not affect the validity, effect, enforceability or interpretation of the remaining provisions of this Agreement.

B. The Parties understand and acknowledge that the foregoing release extends to any claims or damages, without limitation, arising out of the Released Claims that may exist on the date of the execution of this Agreement, but which the Parties do not know to exist, which, if known, would have materially affected their decision to execute this Agreement, regardless of whether their lack of knowledge is a result of ignorance, oversight, error, negligence or any other cause.

C. Each Party acknowledges and agrees that this Agreement is a compromise and settlement of their disputes and differences, and is not an admission of liability or wrongdoing by any Party.

D. Except as provided in section 1.C. of this Agreement, each of the Parties waives any and all claims for the recovery of any costs, expenses, or fees, including attorney fees, associated with the matters and claims released in this Agreement.

5. Representations and Warranties

A. Prospective Plaintiffs hereby represent and warrant to the City, as of the Effective Date, as follows:

i. They have not heretofore assigned or transferred, or purported to assign or transfer, to any party not named herein any Released Claim, or any part or portion thereof.

ii. To the best of their knowledge, there are no legal actions, suits or similar proceedings pending and served, or threatened in writing against the Prospective Plaintiffs that would adversely affect their ability to consummate the transactions contemplated in this Agreement. To the best of their knowledge, Prospective Plaintiffs are not aware of any existing claims nor of any facts that might give rise to any claims of any type or nature against the City, whether asserted or not, that have not been fully released and discharged by the release set forth in this Agreement.

iii. Prospective Plaintiffs have freely entered into this Agreement and are not entering into this Agreement because of any duress, fear, or undue influence; this Agreement is being entered into in good faith.

iv. Prospective Plaintiffs have made such investigation of the facts pertaining to this Agreement as they deem necessary.

v. Prospective Plaintiffs have, prior to the execution of this Agreement, obtained the advice of independent legal counsel of their own selection regarding the substance of this Agreement and the claims released herein.

B. In executing this Agreement, Prospective Plaintiffs acknowledge, represent, and warrant to the City that they have not relied upon any statement or representation of any City officer, agent, employee, representative, or attorney regarding any facts not expressly set forth within this Agreement. In entering into this Agreement, Prospective Plaintiffs assume the risk of any misrepresentations, concealment or mistake, whether or not they should subsequently discover or assert for any reason that any fact relied upon by them in entering into this Agreement was untrue, or that any fact was concealed from them, or that their understanding of the facts or of the law was incorrect or incomplete.

C. The representations and warranties of each of the Parties set forth in this Section 4 and elsewhere in this Agreement will survive the execution and delivery of this Agreement and are a material part of the consideration to the City in entering into this Agreement.

6. Interpretation

A. The Parties have cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement and, in any construction or interpretation to be made of this Agreement, the same shall not be construed against any Party. This Agreement is the product of bargained for and arm's

length negotiations between the Parties and their counsel. This Agreement is the joint product of the Parties.

B. This Agreement is an integrated contract and sets forth the entire agreement between the Parties with respect to the subject matter contained herein. All agreements, covenants, representations and warranties, express or implied, oral or written, of the Parties with regard to such subject matter are contained in this Agreement. No other agreements, covenants, representations or warranties, express or implied, oral or written, have been made or relied on by either Party.

C. This Agreement may not be changed, modified or amended except by written instrument specifying that it amends such agreement and signed by both Parties. No waiver of any provision of this Agreement shall be deemed or shall constitute a waiver of any other provision whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver be deemed a continuing waiver; and no waiver shall be implied from delay or be binding unless executed in writing by the party making the waiver.

D. All of the covenants, releases and other provisions herein contained in favor of the persons and entities released are made for the express benefit of each and all of the said persons and entities, each of which has the right to enforce such provisions.

E. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of each of the Parties, and their respective representatives, officers, employees, agents, heirs, devisees, successors and assigns.

7. Further Cooperation

Each Party shall perform any further acts and execute and deliver any further documents that may be reasonably necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions and intent of this Agreement. Except as expressly stated otherwise in this Agreement, actions required of the Parties or any of them will not be unreasonably withheld or delayed, and approval or disapproval will be given within the time set forth in this Agreement, or, if no time is given, within a reasonable time. Time will be of the essence of actions required of any of the Parties.

8. No Third Party Beneficiaries

Nothing in this Agreement is intended to benefit any third party or create a third party beneficiary. This Agreement will not be enforceable by any person not a Party to this Agreement.

9. Enforced Delay (Force Majeure)

A. Performance by either Party shall not be deemed to be in default where delays or defaults are due to war, insurrection, strikes, walkouts, riots, floods, earthquakes, fires, acts of terrorism, epidemic, quarantine, casualties, acts of God, litigation, governmental

restrictions imposed or mandated by governmental entities, enactment of conflicting state or federal laws or regulations, or other similar circumstances beyond the reasonable control of the Parties and which substantially interferes with the ability of a Party to perform its obligations under this Agreement.

B. An extension of time for any such cause (a "Force Majeure Delay") shall be for the period of the enforced delay and shall commence to run from the time of the commencement of the cause, if notice by the Party claiming such extension is sent to the other Party within thirty (30) days of knowledge of the commencement of the cause. Notwithstanding the foregoing, none of the foregoing events shall constitute a Force Majeure Delay unless and until the Party claiming such delay and interference delivers to the other Party written notice describing the event, its cause, when and how such Party obtained knowledge, the date the event commenced, and the estimated delay resulting therefrom. Either Party claiming a Force Majeure Delay shall deliver such written notice within thirty (30) days after it obtains actual knowledge of the event. The time for performance will be extended for such period of time as the cause of such delay exists but in any event not longer than for such period of time.

10. Governing Law; Venue

This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of California, without regard to any otherwise applicable principles of conflicts of laws. Any action arising out of this Agreement must be commenced in the state courts of the State of California, County of Santa Barbara, and each party hereby consents to the jurisdiction of the above courts in any such action and to venue in the State of California, County of Santa Barbara, and agrees that such courts have personal jurisdiction over each of them.

11. Counterparts

This Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which when so executed shall be deemed to be an original, and such counterparts together shall constitute one and the same instrument.